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FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY




Asbestos can be blamed for hundreds of thousands of deaths
and injuries and has the potential to be blamed for hundreds of
thousands more deaths and injuries over the next few decades.1
Asbestos has forced nearly seventy corporations into bankruptcy,
has caused a near crisis in the insurance industry where it has
raised questions of industry wide solvency, and has resulted in
tens of thousands of lost jobs and millions of lost pension-fund
dollars. 2 A single substance has caused all of these tragedies:
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law, A.B., 2002,
Georgetown University.
1 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (quoting Report
of The Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (1991))
("Predictions have been made of 200,000 asbestos disease deaths before the year
2000 and as many as 265,000 by the year 2015."); see also Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act ("FAIR Act") of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) ("A great
number of Americans have been exposed to forms of asbestos that can have
devastating health effects."); Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing on S. 1125 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 399 (2003) [hereinafter Dr.
Peterson Testimony] (statement of Dr. Mark A. Peterson) ("By now 300,000 workers
have died because of their asbestos exposures. Almost as many more will die over
the next three or four decades. Millions more exposed workers have or will develop
asbestosis or pleural disease.").
2 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(4) ("Asbestos litigation has
had a significant detrimental effect on the country's economy, driving companies
into bankruptcy, diverting resources from those who are truly sick, and endangering
jobs and pensions."). In 1982, Johns-Manville, the largest manufacturer of asbestos
in the United States, declared the first asbestos-related bankruptcy. See Asbestos
Litigation Crisis: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 167 (2003) [hereinafter Senator Hagel Testimony] (statement of
Senator Chuck Hagel, former Johns-Manville Trustee). Johns-Manville was the
primary defendant in asbestos litigation in the 1970s. After Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973), where the Fifth Circuit
held manufacturers of asbestos strictly liable, Johns-Manville had no choice but to
file for bankruptcy. See also Alex Berenson, Asbestos Accord is Said to be Near, N.Y.
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asbestos.3 Though the use of asbestos largely ended in the mid-
1970s, the long latency period of asbestos-related bodily injuries
has made this a modern problem. 4 Nearly 300,000 asbestos
personal injury cases are currently before courts throughout the
United States and hundreds of thousands more are expected
over the next few decades. 5 The Supreme Court labeled the
asbestos litigation problem an "elephantine mass."6 The massive
number of asbestos claims have clogged court dockets,
unnecessarily delayed compensation for asbestos victims, and
raised the transaction costs of bringing asbestos claims to an
TIMEs, April 24, 2003, at Al ("Already, lawsuits have forced into bankruptcy almost
70 companies, some of which were only peripherally connected to asbestos."). At the
Committee Hearings for the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, Dr.
Frederick C. Dunbar's testimony painted a bleak picture of the economic
consequences of the asbestos crisis:
Asbestos-related bankruptcies and the associated layoffs will have ripple
effects that harm many groups beyond company stockholders. Workers will
suffer in many ways, including temporary or long-term unemployment,
lower long-term earnings, and inadequate and/or more expensive interim
health coverage. Taxpayers will bear the financial burden of publicly
funded retraining programs and increased unemployment insurance
payments. Residents and local businesses in affected communities will
suffer as a result of reduced economic activity, lower property values, and
reduced local tax revenues.
Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 314 (2003) [hereinafter Dr. Dunbar Testimony] (statement of
Dr. Frederick C. Dunbar). Dr. Dunbar has estimated that between 52,000 and
60,000 workers have lost their jobs as a result of asbestos liability induced
bankruptcies and he expects this number to continue to grow. Id.
3 See Dr. Peterson Testimony, supra note 1, at 399 (attributing hundreds of
thousands of death and injuries to asbestos); see also FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125,
108th Cong. § 2; Berenson, supra note 2 (discussing the problems caused by
asbestos including death, personal injury, and a weakened economy).
4 See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 190 (2002) [hereinafter Kazan Testimony] (statement of Steven Kazan);
see also Berenson, supra note 2, at C6 ('Most American companies stopped using
asbestos decades ago, but the number of lawsuits continues to rise."); infra notes
17-18 and accompanying text.
5 See Dr. Peterson Testimony, supra note 1, at 400-01 (calculating that there
are approximately 294,800 claims pending before state and federal courts and that
in the future somewhere between 1,903,331 and 2,439,507 more claims are
expected); see also Berenson, supra note 2, at C6 (estimating that over 700,000
asbestos claims have been filed since asbestos was discovered and that
approximately 200,000 of those claims have been filed in the past two years alone).
6 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) ("[This case is a class
action prompted by the elephantine mass of asbestos cases, and ... this litigation
defies customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation."). The
Court has reiterated its characterization of asbestos litigation in Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003).
enormous level.7 Citing these other problems, Congress has
responded by attempting to create a national solution to the
asbestos problem.8
Over the last decade, both houses of Congress have proposed
several bills aimed at solving this problem, yet none have been
enacted.9 In 2003, Senator Orrin Hatch proposed the Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003 ("FAIR Act") 10 before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.1' After a long series of
hearings, compromises, and amendments, the bill passed in the
Committee and was sent to the full floor of the Senate for further
debate and ultimately a final vote. 12  While most of the
contention surrounding the bill concerns the total value of the
fund, other provisions require amendment or adoption in order
for the FAIR Act to achieve its purpose of a nationwide solution
to the asbestos problem.
Part I of this Note will consider the current problems
associated with asbestos claims in the state and federal courts
and in the insurance industry. Part II and III analyze the
background of the FAIR Act, the mechanics of the Act, and how
it will help the current asbestos litigation problems. Part IV
discusses ways to improve the asbestos bill to ensure that it will
7 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 866-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing the numerous
problems caused by asbestos personal injury litigation in its current state).
8 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 2; Asbestos Litigation Crisis:
Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 160-61
(2003) [hereinafter Senator Hatch Statement] (statement of Senator Orrin G.
Hatch) (introducing the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act to the Judiciary
Committee for hearings by briefly describing the problems of asbestos litigation that
require a national solution).
9 See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, S. 2546, 105th
Cong. (1998); Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, H.R. 3905, 105th
Cong. (1998); see also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
10 FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong.
11 See S. REP. NO. 108-118, at 4 (2003). Senator Hatch has made a resolution of
the asbestos crisis a top priority. See Senator Hatch Statement, supra note 8, at
159. This is not his first attempt at a nationwide solution to the asbestos crisis;
Senator Hatch sponsored an asbestos fund bill in 1998. See Fairness in Asbestos
Compensation Act of 1998, S. 2546, 105th Cong. (1998). The Committee did not
approve the bill. However, the exponential growth of claims and bankruptcies in the
past few years has raised interest in a nationwide legislative act on asbestos. See
Dr. Dunbar Testimony, supra note 2, at 317 (determining that asbestos-related
bankruptcies have increased dramatically since 1998); Berenson, supra note 2, at
Al (stating that over 200,000 claims have been filed in the last two years); see also
infra note 57 and accompanying text.
12 See S. REP. NO. 108-118, at 4-16.
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become law and will be a successful and permanent solution to
the asbestos litigation problems.
I. ASBESTOS-RELATED BODILY INJURY CLAIMS CREATE UNIQUE
PROBLEMS IN TORT LAW REQUIRING NATIONAL ACTION
Asbestos cases are unique among other mass torts because
of the high rate of exposure, the long latency period, and the
variety and seriousness of illnesses associated with the
substance-all of which require the legislature to take national
action to solve this problem. Asbestos, when first discovered,
was considered a miracle substance and was widely used in
insulation, bricks, brake pads, and many other common
products.1 3 Because of the widespread use of asbestos, tens of
millions of people have been exposed to the substance. 14 Many of
those exposed to asbestos will not become ill because the
exposure was not severe enough. 15 However, persons who have
been severely exposed, or exposed for a long period of time, are at
a greater risk of developing an asbestos-related illness. 16
Because asbestos is, for the most part, no longer used in
industry, one would expect that everyone who has been seriously
13 See id. at 16-17. As described by the Committee Report accompanying the
FAIR Act:
Asbestos is a fibrous mineral used in many products due to its resistance
to fire, corrosion, and acid. In the early part of the 20th Century, asbestos
was regarded as a miracle fiber because it was versatile enough to weave
into textiles, integrate into insulation, line the brakes of automobiles, and
construct flame-retardant hulls for naval and merchant ships. Annual
asbestos production climaxed some 30 years ago, and had been
incorporated into thousands of products by this time.
Id. at 17.
14 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 450 (2003) [hereinafter Dr. Welch Testimony]
(statement of Dr. Laura Welch). The exact number of workers exposed to asbestos is
unknown. Id. However, the consensus estimate is that 27.5 million people were
occupationally exposed, in addition to an unknown number of family members of
those workers due to take home exposure. Id. Of these 27.5 million occupationally
exposed, it is estimated that 18.8 million can qualify as having serious exposure. Id.
15 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 194 (noting that some exposed
plaintiffs will not manifest any symptoms).
16 Id. Workers that mined asbestos or handled the product in its raw form, such
as for insulation of fireproofing, are most likely to develop an illness. See Dr. Welch
Testimony, supra note 14, at 456. In addition, the longer a person worked with
asbestos, the exponentially greater the chance of developing an asbestos-related
disease. See id.
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exposed has been identified.17  However, asbestos-related
illnesses are unique because of the extremely long latency period
of the diseases associated with exposure to asbestos.18 The
latency period after the final exposure to asbestos can be as long
as forty years before the person manifests any symptoms or
discovers evidence of a potential injury,19 which means that the
extent of the asbestos problem cannot accurately be predicted.
The long latency period has also created a problem with the
statute of limitations for asbestos claims in many states.
Aggressive plaintiffs' lawyers, through solicitations and
advertisements, have identified people who have been exposed to
asbestos in the past, and have secured free screenings for them.
20
Some plaintiffs' lawyers have used advertising campaigns that
ask the public to come in for a free screening to "[flind out if
17 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 190. After Congress created OSHA in
the early 1970s and began setting safety standards for employers, companies for the
most part stopped using asbestos. Id. Because of these regulations, there were few
new exposures after 1973. Id. However, some companies continue to use asbestos
and some new exposures are occurring.
18 See id. at 191-92. Exposure to asbestos causes the fibers to be inhaled into
the lungs. Id. The fibers gradually travel to the outside lining of the lung called the
pleural lining. Id. The fibers cause the pleural lining to scar. Id. These scars
eventually become so numerous that they form a plaque on the lung and are visible
on x-rays. Id. The plaque prevents the flow of oxygenated blood to the rest of the
body, which causes breathing problems and a gradual weakening of the lungs. Id.
The plaque can also cause lung cancer and mesothelioma, which are almost
invariably fatal. Id.
19 See id. at 191-92 (concluding that the latency period is usually 30 years, but
for mesothelioma the latency period can be as long as 40 years); see also Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997).
20 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 197. This phenomenon began after
plaintiffs' lawyers were able to win verdicts and settle cases against asbestos
defendants with plaintiffs that have proof of exposure through an x-ray showing a
pleural plaque, but have not manifested any symptoms. See id. Once this practice
had been established, the following practice became common:
"[P]laintiff law firms in areas of heavy asbestos exposure (such as
jurisdictions with shipyards or petrochemical facilities) had learned that
they could succeed against asbestos defendants by filing large numbers of
claims, grouping them together and negotiating with defendants on behalf
of the entire group ....
To identify more potential claimants, plaintiff law firms began to promote
mass screenings of asbestos workers at or near their places of employment.
Plaintiff law firms would bring suit on behalf of all of the workers who
showed signs of exposure, sometimes filing hundreds of cases under a
single docket number."
Id. at 197-98 (quoting RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Asbestos Litigation Costs
and Compensation: An Interim Report, at 23 (September 2002)).
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YOU have MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS."21 The statute of
limitations on an asbestos claim in many states begins to run
when the exposure has been identified, which is called the
"discovery" rule.22 Many of the people who have been found
positive for potentially harmful exposure are then forced to bring
suit before they have manifested any symptoms or been
specifically diagnosed.23  The identification of potentially
harmful exposure can turn out to be nothing, or can be an early
warning sign of a deadly form of cancer-mesothelioma. 24
Plaintiffs who are not accurately diagnosed will often settle their
claims for a minimum amount, thereby foreclosing them from
further recovery should a more serious illness manifest itself in
the future. 25
The current state of asbestos litigation is plagued with
problems, including extremely long delays in claim resolution,
inconsistent results, and defendants being forced into
bankruptcy. The long delays associated with bringing asbestos
claims are most notable in the federal courts. Under the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, all of the asbestos claims in
federal court were transferred to a single court. 26 This massive
class action, representing tens of thousands of claims, has been
going on for over a decade with no settlement or trial in sight.27
One district court calculated that "[i]f the Court could somehow
close thirty cases a month, it would take six and one-half years
to try these cases and there would be pending over 5,000
untouched cases at the present rate of filing. Transaction costs
21 Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 208.
22 See id at 207. The statute of limitations varies from state to state; however,
many states have a discovery rule for a latent injury caused by prior exposure. This
means that once a potential plaintiff discovers the exposure, his cause of action is
ripe and the statute of limitations begins to run. For example, Ohio, a state where
asbestos claims are common, has adopted the discovery rule. See, e.g., Melnyk v.
Cleveland Clinic, 290 N.E.2d 916, 917 (Ohio 1972).
23 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 207 (stating that people "are often
forced by the statute of limitations to file lawsuits before they are really sick").
24 See id. at 193-94 (stating that the early diagnosis of a pleural plaque, which
proves asbestos exposure, does not reveal a true diagnosis that requires a full
physical exam).
25 See id. at 207 ('This can come back to haunt individuals who later develop
cancer, because some states still maintain a 'single disease' rule, which precludes a
second lawsuit just when the individual is facing a serious injury and needs to
provide for his family.").
26 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997).
27 See id. at 599-602.
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would be astronomical."28  The same court estimated that of
every dollar spent on asbestos litigation and resolution, only
thirty-nine cents is going to plaintiffs and the remaining sixty-
one cents is spent on transaction costs. 29 All of the parties are
suffering from serious delays, which have led to mounting
attorney fees.
Like the federal court system, the state courts also suffer
from long delays and increased transaction costs. However, the
states face a unique problem related to inconsistent results. 30 In
states that are generous to asbestos claimants, such as
Mississippi, plaintiffs have quickly gone to trial and have
obtained multi-million dollar verdicts. 31 Juries in Mississippi
have returned twenty verdicts of $9 million or more since 1995,
and at least seven were for more than $100 million. 32 Some
commentators and plaintiffs' lawyers have labeled it the "magic
jurisdiction" because of these astounding results.33 In states
traditionally hostile to asbestos claims, plaintiffs have received
smaller verdicts or have been forced to settle.
34
In addition, many claims in the last few decades have been
taken out of the civil court system by the bankruptcy courts
because asbestos claims made many defendants insolvent.
3 5
These claims were then satisfied under trusts set up under the
bankruptcy code, by which plaintiffs did not receive the anything
near the full value of their claim.36 Overall, in the absence of a
national solution to the asbestos problem, the current state of
litigation is not achieving justice for any of the parties involved.
A. Problems in the State Court Systems
In order to understand the impact of the FAIR Act and how
it can be improved, the full scope of the asbestos problem must
be examined. At the state level, the differences in procedures
28 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990),
revd, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
29 Id. at 651.
30 See Albert B. Crenshaw, For Asbestos Victims, Compensation Remains





35 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
36 See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at E01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000).
2005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.79:195
and substantive laws have led to unequal and inconsistent
litigation outcomes, and as a result, claimants over the last
decade have begun forum shopping.37  For example, some
plaintiffs, in generous states, have received verdicts of up to
$250 million. Certain states do not scrutinize plaintiff classes,
as do the federal courts following the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 38 often resulting in classes where there may be
conflicts of interest and unfairness. 39 Many times, seriously ill
plaintiffs are grouped together with plaintiffs that have been
exposed to asbestos but have not exhibited any symptoms. 40
Despite very different interests, these plaintiffs are treated the
same for the purposes of litigation in certain states.
Though asbestos claimants are found in almost every state,
the majority of claims have been brought in Mississippi, New
York, Texas, West Virginia, and Ohio. 41 Over 21,000 claims were
filed in Jefferson County, Mississippi where the population is
only 9,700.42 States with sympathetic juries that grant favorable
37 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing on S. 1125 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 360 (2003) [hereinafter Dr. Hartwig Testimony]
(statement of Dr. Robert Hartwig) ("Under the present tort system, hundreds of
thousands of victims-up to 90% of whom are unimpaired by any asbestos related-
illness-are able to move from state to state setting their sights on the most
sympathetic jurisdictions and judges."). The result of forum shopping has led to
significant verdicts in some jurisdictions and much smaller judgments in others. See
id.
38 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 207, 211-12. Though many states
have, for the most part, adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the results
often turn out to be different. See id. at 211-12. For example, though many asbestos
classes have been certified by state courts, the Supreme Court has twice decided
that asbestos classes generally cannot legally be certified. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
628 (1997). The Supreme Court decisions suggest that in federal courts, the state
classes would not be certified.
39 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 (refusing to certify the class of asbestos victims
because an inherent conflict exists between current and future plaintiffs).
40 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4 at, 207, 214 (discussing how the
consolidation of unimpaired plaintiffs with seriously ill plaintiffs often results in the
ill plaintiffs receiving a smaller recovery). Seriously injured plaintiffs seek high
levels of compensation to offset the loss of income and expensive medical bills, while
unimpaired plaintiffs will usually look to settle quickly just so they can recover
something.
41 S. REP. NO. 108-118, at 15 (2003). This trend is alarming considering that
many asbestos plants and manufacturers of products containing asbestos were not
located in these states. See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 212-13.
42 See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at E01. Jefferson County is known to be
extremely sympathetic to asbestos plaintiffs and has awarded huge verdicts, leading
many plaintiffs to shop for this and other forums in Mississippi. See id. ("[The
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verdicts to asbestos plaintiffs are flooded with claims, while
plaintiffs in other jurisdictions, unable to afford litigation in a
foreign state court, are deterred from bringing suit.43 In addition
to the differences in laws between the states, settlement
amounts and verdicts differ significantly among various
geographic regions. 44
B. Problems in the Federal Courts and a "Supreme" Plea for
Congressional Action
Cases filed in federal court are plagued with similar
problems of delay, enormous transaction costs, and clogged
dockets. 45 The federal court system attempted to resolve these
problems for asbestos litigation through the use of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML"). 46 In 1993, the JPML
transferred all asbestos personal injury cases pending in federal
asbestos problem has led to] 'forum shopping' by trial lawyers seeking friendly
juries.").
43 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4, at 213 ("[Forum shopping] allows
plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid the effect of state efforts to bring asbestos litigation
under control. Thus, for example, if Pennsylvania requires functional impairment as
a prerequisite for bringing an asbestos claim, Pennsylvania cases will migrate to
other jurisdictions, such as West Virginia or Mississippi [where the requirement
does not exist].").
44 See Berenson, supra note 2, at Al ("Under the current system of lawsuits,
some people who are sick or dying from asbestos exposure receive little
money .... Others, including some who are not sick, get millions of dollars from
sympathetic juries.").
45 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 866-68 (1999) (Breyer, S.,
dissenting) (discussing the "[u]nusually high litigation costs," "unusually long
delays," and clogged dockets that would take years to resolve).
46 See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997) ("In the face
of legislative inaction, the federal courts-lacking authority to replace state tort
systems with a national toxic tort compensation regime-endeavored to work with
the procedural tools available to improve management of federal asbestos
litigation."). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was created by Congress
to transfer related cases for pretrial proceedings to a single district court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000) ("When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."). The purpose of
the statute is to promote efficiency and uniformity of pretrial proceedings, and
eliminate repetitive discovery. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
644 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1981). Transferring asbestos cases via the JPML seems to
clearly satisfy the purpose of the statute, even though the JPML had refused to
transfer asbestos cases in the past. See, e.g., In re Asbestos School Products
Liability, 606 F. Supp. 713, 714 (J.P.M.L. 1985); In re Asbestos and Asbestos
Insulation Material Products Liability Litigation, 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.L.
1977).
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courts to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Judge
Weiner. 47 A steering committee of plaintiffs' lawyers organized a
massive class action under the federal rules and began
negotiating a settlement with the asbestos defendants. 48 The
parties eventually concluded two settlements, the first involving
all current claimants, and the second involving all future
claimants. 49 The massive settlements suggested that a judicial
solution to the asbestos problem would be possible if the court
would certify the class and approve the settlement, which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require. 50  Judge Weiner
conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes only,51
but the Third Circuit reversed. 52 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari 53 and affirmed the Third Circuit's decision. 54
The Court held that the class did not satisfy the
requirements of the Federal Rules and conflicts of interest
47 See In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415,
422-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599. The JPML chose the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania because that district had the most claims pending
of any of jurisdiction, was experienced in complex litigation, and was willing to take
on all of the asbestos cases. In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 771
F. Supp. at 422-23. Judge Weiner was selected because he had significant
experience with asbestos litigation on the bench and was agreeable to the majority
of the parties to the cases. Id. at 423. The transfer of cases to Judge Weiner, being
the first asbestos transfer to the JPML, suggests that the growing litigation
problem and lack of congressional action played a role in the decision.
48 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599-601. Plaintiffs appointed a steering committee
to handle settlement negotiations, while the defendants created a joint defense
arrangement called the Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR"). Id. The CCR
consisted of twenty former asbestos manufacturers. Id.
49 Id. at 600-01. The settlement of all future asbestos cases arose from the
settlement discussion for the pending plaintiffs. See id. The CCR refused to settle
the pending claims without "some kind of protection for the future." Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
50 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23. In order to certify the class, the court must be
satisfied that the class meets the requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The class must
also then fit into one of three different categories of classes. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
Once the court has certified the class, it must approve the settlement. FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(e). The court will only approve a settlement if the terms are fair to all of the
class members. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605.
51 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 246, 337. The class was certified for settlement
only-it was considered a settlement class because the complaint, answer, joint
motion for certification, and proposed settlement agreement were filed together. See
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601-02 ("The class action thus instituted was not intended to
be litigated.").
52 Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 635 (3d Cir. 1996).
53 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 519 U.S. 957 (1996).
54 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997).
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prevented the approval of the settlement. 55 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the Court, reluctantly refused to certify the class. 56
Though the class could not legally be certified, the Court
recognized the asbestos problem and articulated a need for a
national solution.57 Despite the Court's desire for a solution, it
acknowledged that the federal courts could not solve the asbestos
problem.58 Instead, Justice Ginsburg called on the legislature to
take action and form a "national asbestos dispute-resolution
scheme." 59  Two other similar asbestos cases have reached the
Supreme .Court, and each time the Court has been unable to help
solve the asbestos problem.60 In both cases, the Court reiterated
the need for a national legislative solution. 61
55 See id. at 626 ("[T]he interests of those within the single class are not
aligned.... [Flor the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate
payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring
an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.").
56 See id. at 597-98. Justice Ginsburg recognized the seriousness of the
asbestos crisis, but acknowledged that the courts lack the power to create a
nationwide solution and cannot change the laws governing the asbestos problem.
See id. at 599 ("In the face of legislative inaction, the federal courts ... lack
authority to replace state tort systems with a national toxic tort compensation
regime .. "); see also Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 141 (2003)
(stating that the laws could not be rewritten solely because of the asbestos crisis).
57 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598-99.
58 See id. at 598-99. But see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 868 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the asbestos problem is so severe that the
Court should stretch the laws to their maximum and allow the class to be certified).
Justice Breyer's dissent cites the long delays, massive number of claims, the
clogging of court dockets, and the fact that many seriously injured plaintiffs do not
survive long enough to receive compensation as reasons why the Court must take
some action. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 867-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting). These problems led
Justice Breyer to state that "in these circumstances, I believe our Court should
allow a district court full authority to exercise every bit of discretionary power that
the law provides." Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Breyer stated that
asbestos-related injuries are tort claims and are traditionally resolved by the courts.
Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 595, 628 ("[A] nationwide administrative claims
processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of
compensating victims of asbestos exposure.").
60 See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 538 U.S. 135; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864-65. In
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., railroad employees sued their employer for negligence in
exposing them to asbestos and causing their asbestosis. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,
538 U.S. at 140. Plaintiffs also sued to recover damages for their fears of developing
cancer due to their asbestos exposure. Id. Defendants challenged recovery on this
ground and also argued against joint and several liability in asbestos cases. Id. at
141. The Supreme Court held that damages for fear of developing cancer are
recoverable and that joint and several liability applied in asbestos cases, stating
that the court "decline[s] to write new law by requiring an initial apportionment of
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C. Problems in the Insurance Industry: Solvency in Doubt
Asbestos claims have also had a significant impact on the
insurance industry.62 Almost all of the asbestos manufacturers
and other asbestos-related defendants were insured for asbestos
claims on policies written decades ago. The insurance industry
has been hit hard by the flood of asbestos claims in recent years
and has been forced to significantly increase its reserves in order
to pay these claims on the old policies. 63  Many insurance
companies have now started to specifically write out pollution or
asbestos-type claims from their policies to avoid a similar
situation in the future.64 Though the new exclusionary language
in these policies may solve future problems for the insurance
industry, the industry still faces significant liability for all of the
current claims. Under some estimates, the value of the asbestos
claims may exceed the total amount of some insurers' reserves
for all claims. 65 These problems have been recognized, and the
damages among potential tortfeasors." Id. By limiting the damages to defendants
and rejecting joint and several liability, the Court would have made the asbestos
problem less devastating for defendants, and therefore more manageable. However,
the Court was unwilling to change the laws to adapt to asbestos litigation. Id.
In Ortiz, a group of defendant manufacturers of asbestos products agreed to a
global settlement with a group of plaintiffs' lawyers that represented approximately
45,000 claimants. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 824. The global settlement included all current
and future claimants against the defendants. Id. at 827-28. The parties filed a
motion for class certification under the Limited Fund Doctrine, FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(B). Id. at 828. The District Court certified the class and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class could not meet the
requirements of predominance and commonality and that the limited fund doctrine
did not apply to situations where the parties agreed that the fund was limited. See
id. at 864-65.
61 See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 538 U.S. at 166; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. In
Ortiz, the Court referred to its discussion in Amchem regarding the necessity for
"federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution scheme." Ortiz,
527 U.S. at 821-22 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (quoting Report of The
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Comm. on Asbestos Litigation 2-3 (1991))). More
recently, in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., the Court stated that the asbestos problem
"defies customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation." Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co., 538 U.S. at 166 (quoting Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821-22).
62 See Diane Levick, Insurers Need Government Help in 'New Era of Risk,
HARTFORD COURANT, October 1, 2003, at E2.
63 See id. Ms. Levick compared the asbestos problems to the problems of
insuring against terrorist strikes, which was the subject of a recent federal
enactment to provide a federal backstop for these claims. See id.
64 See Carolyn Aldred, U.K. Asbestos Exclusions Likely to Spread, BUSINESS




insurance industry has been included in the national dispute
resolution scheme described in the FAIR Act of 2004.66
II. CONGRESS STRIKES BACK: THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONWIDE
SOLUTION TO THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
In response to the calls of the Supreme Court, Congress has
made several attempts to create a national trust fund for victims
of asbestos-related bodily injury. 67 Seemingly every member of
Congress agrees that a national solution is preferable to the
current state of asbestos litigation. However, Congress has been
unable to agree on how to accomplish this objective. 68 Previous
attempts to create a fund, such as the Fairness in Asbestos
Compensation Act, proposed in 1998, suffered from a variety of
problems and quickly died in congressional committee. 69
Nevertheless, Senator Orrin Hatch made the establishment of an
asbestos trust fund one of his main priorities and proposed the
FAIR Act in late April 2003. 70 Senator Hatch built on the
failures of previous asbestos bills, similar national trust funds,
and bankruptcy trusts of asbestos defendants. 71
66 See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. (2004).
67 The most recent response by Congress to the calls of the Supreme Court is
the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2004. Id. In the findings section of
this bill, the text cites to Amchem, Ortiz, and Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. and
comments that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized that Congress
must act to create a more rational asbestos claims system." Id. § 2(a)(6).
68 See S. REP. NO. 108-118, at 1-2 (2003) (Minority Views of Senators Leahy,
Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, Durbin, and Edwards). The Minority
Views Statement of the eight senators who voted against the bill reveals that they
want a national solution to the asbestos problem through a trust fund, but
disagreed with some of the provisions of the bill. See id. at 1-3. Based on their
statement, it seems clear that if certain amendments to the bill are made, they will
vote in favor of the FAIR Act. See id.
69 Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, S. 2546, 105th Cong. (1998);
H.R. 3905, 105th Cong. (May 20, 1998). This bill was referred to the Judiciary
Committee, where no further action was taken on the bill. See 105 CONG. REC.
S11,344 (Oct. 2, 1998). In 2003, the asbestos crisis had been a major issue for many
in Congress. There were four different asbestos bills proposed, none of which did not
made it out of its committee. See generally Asbestos Victims' Compensation Act of
2003, H.R. 1737, 108th Cong. (2003); Asbestos Compensation Fairness Act of 2003,
H.R. 1586, 108th Cong. (2003); Asbestos Compensation Act of 2003, H.R. 1114,
108th Cong. (2003); Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003, S. 413,
108th Cong. (2003).
70 See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 4; Senator Hatch Statement, supra note 8.
71 See Senator Hatch Statement, supra note 8. While introducing the FAIR Act
to the Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch noted that he had worked on a similar
bill in the past, which surely had an impact on the FAIR Act. See id. In addition,
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One example of a national fund where Congress created a
compensation scheme for tort claims is the Black Lung Benefits
Act. 72 Congress created the Black Lung Benefits Act to provide
compensation for coal miners who had become ill as a result of
their employment. 73 The Black Lung Benefits Act creates a no-
fault compensation system for miners, which is incorporated into
state workers' compensation programs. 74 Contributions by mine
operators are required to be paid into the state workers'
compensation program. 75  The Black Lung Benefits Act
illustrates that congressional action to correct a mass tort crisis
is not a novel and unpopular concept.
testimony taken at the committee hearings discussed other similar legislation and
how those past experiences can aid the FAIR Act, including: the Black Lung fund,
September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, Vaccine Compensation, state workers
compensation statutes, and national bankruptcy funds, like the Johns-Manville
Trust Fund. See Dr. Hartwig Testimony, supra note 37.
Similar to the Black Lung Benefits Act, the FAIR Act has also been influenced
by the Johns-Manville Trust Fund ["Manville Trust"]. The bankruptcy court created
the Manville Trust to compensate asbestos plaintiffs and protect the future of the
company. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Congress based §
524(g) of the bankruptcy code on the Manville Trust. Section 524(g) authorizes the
bankruptcy court to enjoin potential plaintiffs from filing claims against a bankrupt
party. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (2000). Instead, the parties with claims file them
against a trust fund that is established by the bankruptcy court to settle the claims
and make payments to the parties. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B). The fund is administered
privately, through a court-appointed administrator. Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i). There are
currently numerous § 524(g) trust funds in operation, with approximately twenty
more pending approval by bankruptcy courts. Senator Hagel Testimony, supra note
2.
A failure of the Manville Trust has influenced the FAIR Act. The Manville Trust
underestimated the number of claimants and proved to be severely under-funded.
Id. This led to many claimants receiving only five cents on the dollar. See id. At the
Committee Hearings for the FAIR act, the former trustee, Senator Hagel, testified
that:
During 1986, expert claims forecasters testified in the Manville
bankruptcy court that between the late 1980's and 2049, the Manville
Trust would receive between 83,000 and 100,000 claims... [but] only 15
years later, the Manville Trust has received.., over 620,000 claims ....
.... A recent forecast predicted that by 2049 the trust would receive
between 750,000 and 2.7 million additional claims.
Id. The experience of the Manville Trust is a constant reminder that the extent of
asbestos liability and the number of claims is uncertain and should not be
underestimated. Congress must ensure that the FAIR Act will not suffer the same
fate of paying cents on the dollar.
72 30 U.S.C. § 901 (2000).
73 See id.
74 See id. §§ 901-945.
75 See id.
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In addition to considering past congressional action, Senator
Hatch clearly stated that the bill was not to be rigid, allowing for
negotiations, amendments, and deletions in order to ensure the
bill's success.7 6  He put the goal of a bipartisan legislative
solution ahead of the specific bill he drafted.
77
The FAIR Act went through days of hearings and
negotiations resulting in dozens of amendments.78 After nearly
two months of work on the bill in the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Senator Hatch called for a vote so that the bill could
move on to the full floor of the Senate for further debate.
79
Despite the compromises made during the hearings, the bill
narrowly passed the Committee roll call vote, along party lines,
on July 22, 2003 by a count of 10-8.80 Senate Majority Leader
Frist placed the bill on the legislative calendar, and more
hearings and negotiations took place. A busy Senate calendar in
late 2003 and early 2004-including the war in Iraq and budget
appropriations-delayed the Senators from taking any serious
76 See Senator Hatch Statement, supra note 8. Upon introducing the bill,
Senator Hatch stated that "we are open to constructive suggestions and to
improvements to this bill." Id. He also admitted that there were flaws in the bill as
drafted and it needed improvement. See id. ("[The bill] is not without flaws and this
hearing today is intended to provide expert advice on how best to improve it.").
Senator Hatch's openness to criticism led to a significantly improved bill, compared
to what was first proposed in April of 2003, coming out of the Judiciary Committee.
77 See id. Senator Hatch declared his commitment to a bipartisan solution from
the outset by taking input from all parties when drafting the bill. Id. ("[Tihe
legislation we are examining today, S. 1125 is a product of much discussion and
input from all interested parties. We introduced S. 1125, the bipartisan 'Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003,' in an effort to move the legislative process
along."). This commitment continued throughout the legislative process and Hatch
noted that "[he] incorporated a number of very constructive suggestions by Senator
Leahy and Senator Dodd, and [he] look[s] forward to continuing to work with them
and [his] other colleagues so that [he] can win their full support." Id.
78 See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 5-15 (2003). The FAIR Act was in hearings and
markups for four days, during which time numerous amendments were proposed
and brought to a vote. Id. Some examples of amendments that the Judiciary
Committee passed include banning most uses of asbestos, indexing awards for
future inflation, removing most collateral source offsets, establishing new medical
criteria, and creating a backstop provision. Id. Many of these amendments were
proposed by the minority Senators and received bipartisan support. See id. at 5-15,
190.
79 See id. at 4.
80 See id. One Senator declined to vote on the bill. Id. Of the ten favorable votes
for the FAIR Act, only one came from a Democrat, Senator Diane Feinstein, while
the other senators voted along party lines. Id. at 5; see also Alex Berenson, Senate
Panel Approves Bill to Establish Asbestos Trust, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at C1
(discussing the Committee roll call vote that approved the FAIR Act).
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action on the bill. On April 7, 2004, Senator Hatch reintroduced
the FAIR Act, amended to reflect the results of nearly one year's
worth of compromises since the bill was first introduced.81
Although this amended version of the FAIR Act is the most
promising version, it still requires more work, and on October 8,
2004, Congress recessed without voting on it.
III. FAIRNESS IN ASBESTOS INJURY RESOLUTION ACT OF 2004:
THE MECHANICS OF THE SOLUTION TO THE ASBESTOS CRISIS
The FAIR Act proposes to establish a national trust fund for
asbestos victims and mandates that insurers and direct asbestos
defendants participate in the fund.8 2 All present and future
claims would be removed from the civil court system and
compensation would be paid to plaintiffs on a no-fault basis.8 3
Though the FAIR Act does not require proof of liability or
causation, claimants must meet certain standards in order to
establish a right to recover.8 4 In addition to basic identification
information, a claimant must provide a detailed work history
and description of asbestos exposure, identify the asbestos-
related disease and submit certifying medical documentation,
and disclose any previous lawsuits and recovery amounts from
judgments or settlements.8 5 A significant compromise during the
committee hearings resulted in the elimination of the
requirement that claimants must identify the specific product or
defendant that caused the exposure. 6 This would have made it
more difficult for claimants to recover under the Act, since many
people were exposed up to forty years ago and may not
remember the exact product.
The fund would remain in effect for twenty-seven years,
after which time participation by defendants and insurers would
81 FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. (2004).
82 See id. § 2(b)(1).
83 Id. §§ 111-112 (stating what is and what is not required for making claims
from the national fund); id. § 403 (allowing all claims to be removed from both state
and federal courts and barring future asbestos claims in both court systems).
84 Id. §§ 111-114(b).
85 Id. § 113(c).
86 Id. In addition to the aforementioned requirements, the claimant must also
include a description of the claimant's history of tobacco use, because the illnesses
are similar and tobacco use combined with asbestos exposure increases the risk of
illness even further. Id. § 113(c)(5). A claimant who has a history of smoking would
stand to receive less compensation under the Act. See id. § 131.
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be voluntary, and any opting-out defendants would again be
subject to tort liability.87 The FAIR Act awards compensation
based on certain categories of illnesses, gradually increasing
with the seriousness of the injury to a maximum recovery of
approximately one million dollars.88 There are ten different
categories of illnesses listed in the FAIR Act.8 9  For each
category, the Act lists the specific type of medical evidence to
establish compensation under each category. 90 The evidence
required for the categories generally consists of chest x-rays and
the diagnosis of a certified physician. 91 Placement within a
category depends on the number of years the claimant was
exposed to asbestos and the seriousness of the exposure. 92 Five
categories are for non-malignant diseases including: exposure
only, difficulty breathing, and varying degrees of asbestosis.
93
There are also five categories of malignant diseases: varying
types of cancers (throat, stomach, etc.), lung cancer, and, the
most serious, mesothelioma. 94  These categories include a
designation for plaintiffs who have been exposed to asbestos but
remain uninjured or have not yet manifested any symptoms. 95
For these plaintiffs, the Act allows compensation for medical
monitoring and for reclassification into a different illness
category should any symptoms manifest themselves during the
traditionally long latency period of asbestos related illnesses.
96
Plaintiffs who have exhibited symptoms would need only to
submit medical documentation and the exposure details in order
to secure compensation from the fund.97 The relatively low
87 See id. § 203(c)-(h) (providing a schedule of payments for years one through
twenty-seven for the sub-tiers of defendants); id. § 212 (stating the commissioners
collection powers over defendants and insurers).
88 See § 121(d), 131. Categorization is also effected by the smoking history of
the claimants. See id. §§ 131(b)(2)-(3).





94 Id. § 121(d)(6)-(10).
95 Id. § 121(d)(1).
96 Id. § 131; see also id. § 132(b) ("Reimbursable medical monitoring costs shall
include the costs of a claimant not covered by health insurance for an examination
by the claimant's physician, x-ray tests, and pulmonary function tests every 3
years.").
97 See id. § 121(d). If a potential plaintiff does not meet the required medical
documentation or exposure details, he may still submit an exceptional medical
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evidentiary requirements and expedited schedule of recovery
ensures that claimants will receive timely compensation and
significantly lowers transaction costs.98
As currently proposed, the mandatory contributions to the
fund would total approximately $125 billion over twenty-seven
years, with $57.5 billion paid by defendants and $46.025 billion
paid by insurers and reinsurers, and the remaining $18 billion to
be paid by preexisting bankruptcy trusts, smaller defendants,
and from interest.9 9  The payments by each individual
contributor are to be calculated based on the dollar amount of
previous asbestos expenditures for settlements, judgments, and
transaction costs; the categories are permanent for the life of the
fund.100 The highest payment for a contributor is estimated at
under $1 billion, spread out over twenty-six years. 101 The Act
offers defendants the opportunity to plan for these payments so
that bankruptcy can be avoided and defense costs can be
substantially reduced.102 It would also end the corporate
claim. See id. § 121(f). The Asbestos Court, provided for by the act, will review any
other medical documentation or evidence submitted by the claimant that may be
relevant. See id. The Act also provides for an appeal if the claim is rejected. See id.
98 In addition to these benefits for claimants, the bill provides for award values
that are to be increased by a cost-of-living increase, to protect future claimants from
inflation which would affect the value of the compensation. See id. § 131(b)(5).
99 See id. §§ 202-203. The total amount of the fund is constantly changing due
to negotiations over this bill. The bill originally called for $90 billion, but was later
amended to $108 billion. FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. §§ 202-203 (2003).
Contributions are required of any defendant that has had "prior asbestos
expenditures greater than $1,000,000." See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. §
202(b).
100 See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 202. The categories are not
affected by a sale of assets, filing of bankruptcy or discharge from bankruptcy. Id.
101 See id. § 203; David G. Savage, Asbestos Bill Could Be Windfall for Business,
L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 1. The payments into the fund by the tier one
contributors in sub-tier one are the group with the highest asbestos expenditures.
See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 203. These contributors are to pay into
the fund a percentage of their gross revenues for the 26-year period with a
maximum rate in year one of 1.5184% and reducing each year throughout the life of
the fund. See id. With certain maximum provisions in the fund, it is approximated
that the top tier will have to pay a maximum of under $1 billion. See id.
102 See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 2. The main purposes of the
FAIR Act are to prevent future bankruptcies, to reduce the transaction costs of
asbestos claims, and to allow more of the money spent on asbestos litigation to end
up in the hands of the victims. See id.; see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751
F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (estimating
that only thirty-nine cents of every dollar spent on asbestos personal injury
litigation goes to victims, with the rest going to lawyers fees and costs); supra note 2
and accompanying text.
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paralysis caused by the massive potential asbestos liabilities in
the court system, which has resulted in layoffs and decreases in
pension fund sizes. 10 3
The insurance industry is required to contribute a total
$46.025 billion to the fund over the fund's twenty-six-year life.
10 4
In its current state, the bill authorizes creation of an Asbestos
Insurers Commission, with members appointed by the President,
to be made up of independent insurance experts who represent
both insurers and reinsurers. 10 5 The Commission would study
the insurance industry, hold hearings and determine its own
apportionment of the contribution amount, and require the
insurance companies to pay that amount. 06 The Asbestos
Insurers Commission would submit their plan in an Allocation
Agreement, which would, in turn, be submitted to Congress and
the Administrator of the fund for approval.
0 7
Moreover, the bill includes other special provisions to aid its
passage. 08 The FAIR Act includes a ban on the use of asbestos
in the United States with only minor exceptions. 0 9 It also
expands the potential group of plaintiffs by including workers'
103 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 2. Because of massive potential
asbestos liability, certain companies have been unable to expand, merge with
another company, acquire another company, or sell off assets as a result of the
uncertainty of the amount of money required to compensate asbestos victims. See
id.; see also Berenson, supra note 2, at Al (acknowledging the effect of asbestos
litigation on defendants and their businesses).
104 See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 212(a)(2)(A).
105 See id. § 211 (discussing the establishment and formation of the asbestos
insurers commission).
106 See id. § 212(a)(1)(B).
107 See id. § 212(a), § 212(c)-(d).
108 See S. REP. No. 108-118 (2003) (containing various provisions that are not
directly related to the fund). Many of these special provisions were added as part of
a compromise during the committee hearings. See id. It is expected that more
provisions of this type will be added as the bill is considered by the full floor of the
Senate in order to garner support for the FAIR Act. See id. at 187.
109 FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 501 ("Prohibition on Asbestos
Containing Products"). Senator Feinstein proposed this amendment during the June
24, 2003 markup session in the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Committee
approved of the amendment. See S. REP. NO. 108-118. Although most companies
have stopped using asbestos, the decision was based on their individual corporate
policies and studies which revealed the dangers of exposure to asbestos. See
Berenson, supra note 2, at C6. Despite the serious and well-known risks of exposure
to asbestos it is still used in some limited circumstances. See S. REP. No. 108-118, at
58. The ban in the FAIR Act allows exception only in very limited cases including
uses certified by the Department of Defense, NASA, or the EPA. See FAIR Act of
2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 501.
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family members who have been exposed by the asbestos fibers
that were brought home by workers on their clothes and in their
hair. 110 In section 121(c)(3), the FAIR Act allows claims from a
"person who alleges their exposure to asbestos was the result of
living with a person who, if the claim had been filed by that
person, would have met the exposure criteria."' 1 ' Many workers
who were severely exposed to asbestos inadvertently brought
home asbestos fibers on their clothes, exposing their family
members. 112 This provision ensures that these victims can make
claims against the fund. However, these claimants are not able
to recover as easily as people occupationally exposed. 113 All
"Take-Home" claimants, except for those who have
mesothelioma, must submit a claim to the special board for
review of the evidence. 14 Likewise, the FAIR Act has a special
provision for the people of Libby, Montana, who resided near
asbestos mines and have been heavily exposed.1 15 The bill also
commissions a study of asbestos-related illnesses and ultimately
seeks a cure to the ailments asbestos has caused. 116
A. Critics Sound Off on the FAIR Act
Though the bill offers significant improvement over the
current asbestos-liability system, numerous critics have
expressed concerns that threaten its passage. Some who oppose
110 FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 121(c)(3).
111 Id.
112 See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 195.
113 See FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 121(c)(3)(B).
114 Id.; see also id. § 121(f) (setting up a special board to review claims of
claimants that do not fit into a specific category or do not meet the medical criteria);
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
115 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 121 (2003). The FAIR Act also
provides a special provision for the residents of Libby, Montana. See id. Libby is a
small town where a common strand of asbestos was mined and processed, and as a
result enormous quantities of fibers were released into the community. Id. Many
people became seriously ill as result of this non-occupational exposure. See id. This
type of claimant must provide medical documentation like other claimants, but
instead of work history, must prove residency within twenty miles of Libby,
Montana for at least twelve consecutive months in order to make a claim. Id.
116 See id. § 121(e). The FAIR Act orders the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences to complete a study within two years of enactment of
the bill to study the causal link between asbestos and forms of cancer, including
colorectal, stomach, esophageal, and laryngeal. Id. The study is to be presented to
the Court of Federal Claims and Congress. Id. This study will allow Congress to
make necessary adjustments such as broadening the medical criteria or changing
the categories of compensation.
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the bill in its current state argue that the payouts to victims are
too low, and do not come close to matching the compensation
available through litigation. 117 Others have expressed concerns
about the long-term solvency of the fund and the ability to adapt,
depending on the number of claimants that emerge, over the life
of the fund. 118 Further, some fear that the fund would not be
able to handle the flood of claims that asbestos victims will file in
the early years of the fund.1 19 Finally, critics representing the
defendants and insurers argue that no additional money is
available to contribute to the fund, and that requiring additional
compensation at various times throughout the life of the fund
would give rise to the same uncertainties and corporate paralysis
as the current litigation system. 120 With significant concerns
being raised by both sides, it is clear that in order for this Act to
become law, serious compromises and changes must be made to
the bill to ensure a satisfactory solution for all parties.
IV. IMPROVING THE FAIR ACT TO ENSURE THAT IT REALLY IS
FAIR AND WILL RESOLVE THE ASBESTOS CRISIS
Despite the promise of the FAIR Act, it is not a perfect
solution to the asbestos crisis. The critics of this bill have raised
serious concerns which may prevent it from becoming law or, if it
is enacted, which may hamper its success. There are three main
improvements that this bill requires: an increase in the size and
timing of the contributions of the eligible defendants and
insurers, a mandatory backstop provision, and a strengthening
117 See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 188-205 (Minority Views of Senators Leahy,
Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, Durbin, and Edwards). In the Minority
Statement, the dissenting Senators argue that the compensation amount for each
disease category should be increased to more closely match the average recovery
amount from litigation. See id. at 199. This contention means that the overall size of
the fund must be raised to meet these demands. See id. at 199, 206. Some estimates
of the overall cost of asbestos litigation will be around $200 billion and the minority
requests that the fund be brought a little closer to this number. See id. at 58, 206.
118 See id. at 195-97.
119 See id. at 208 ("It will take at least several years for the trust fund to
process the 290,000-300,000 asbestos cases that are currently pending. According to
expert testimony before the Committee,... it might take at least 8 years to fully
pay pending claims.").
120 Crenshaw, supra note 30 (mentioning the economic consequences on
corporations with asbestos liabilities because of the uncertainty of the total cost of
resolving those claims).
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of the power of the trust fund's administrator to adapt it to
changing circumstances.
A. Asbestos Fund: Too Little, Too Late?
One main concern about the asbestos bill is the amount of
payments required by the asbestos defendants. The maximum
level of payment by an asbestos defendant is estimated to total
less than $1 billion.1 2' Though this amount of money is
considerable, consider that Halliburton has recently proposed a
settlement of its asbestos claims at approximately $4 billion.122
Under the FAIR Act, Halliburton's contribution would be much
less, saving them in the range of $2.5 billion.123 Other asbestos
defendants have achieved settlements that far exceed their
required contributions under the FAIR Act, which suggests that
these defendants would stand to receive a windfall under the
Act.124 This result suggests that the categories of the defendants
should be adjusted. A category at the top should be created to
represent those companies that have the highest levels of
liability, such as Halliburton, to more closely match what its
liability would have been in the court system.
Another suggestion for the FAIR Act is to change the
timeline for payments into the fund by insurers and defendants.
In its current state, the bill requires payment into the fund each
year for twenty-seven years. 125 This would create a problem
because of the early rush to compensation under the fund.' 26
Instead, the legislature should calculate the value of all of the
currently pending claims under the FAIR Act and order this
121 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 203; Savage, supra note 101, at
1.
122 See Halliburton Seeks Support for Asbestos Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2003, C4.
123 See Berenson, supra note 2, at Al ("Another potential complication is that
one of the biggest beneficiaries of any such settlement could be
Halliburton,... which faces asbestos suits that have depressed its stock price.
Because Vice President Dick Cheney was chairman of the company, any settlement
that benefits Halliburton may be criticized by Democrats.").
124 See, e.g., Senator Hagel Testimony, supra note 2 (estimating that Johns-
Manville has paid out $3.1 billion through 2002).
125 See FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. §§ 202-223.
126 See S. REP. No. 108-118, at 208 (2003) (Minority Views of Senators Leahy,
Kennedy, Biden, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, Durbin, and Edwards) (discussing
possible lag time of eight years to handle all of the claims that would be filed upon
the enactment date of the fund).
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amount to be paid as an initial payment by the contributors.
The fund should then collect the scheduled first year amount to
better handle any additional claims not currently in the court
system that would be filed upon the passage of the bill. This
would ensure that the early claimants would not be subject to
delay, as the fund would be waiting to collect the next year's
payments.
B. Voluntary Backstop Provision: Too Weak to Prevent the Same
Problems?
The FAIR Act does not contain a mandatory backstop
provision to deal with asbestos claims after the fund expires.
While the bill has contemplated voluntary contributions, 127 there
is no guarantee that defendants will make these payments, or
have any incentive to make them. 128 If defendants decide that
they will be able to save money by defending claims in the court
system rather than contributing to the fund, the same problems
that exist now will reoccur. As a result, the FAIR Act is only a
temporary solution to the asbestos problem. 129 At the end of the
fund, defendants that do not make the voluntary contributions
will again be subject to tort liability. Through the ban on
asbestos, and due to the fact that most companies stopped using
asbestos in the 1970s, the exposure of new plaintiffs after the
enactment of this bill will be unlikely. 130 However, the long and
uncertain latency period suggests that there will be claims that
outlive the fund.13' Though these claims will be less numerous,
the same problems will arise-long delays, expensive transaction
costs, and clogged dockets.
The FAIR Act should provide the Administrator of the fund
the power to extend the fund as long as necessary and require
mandatory contributions to continue. Future victims of asbestos
should not be penalized solely because of the long and
unpredictable latency period. The extension should be from
127 FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 223(g).
128 See id. In addition, if a defendant has become insolvent, the voluntary
contribution could become problematic because of the involvement of the
Bankruptcy Court.
129 See id. §§ 201-204 (requiring mandatory funds in years one through twenty-
seven, while subsequent contributions are voluntary).
130 See Kazan Testimony, supra note 4; see also FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125,
108th Cong. § 838 (prohibition on asbestos containing products).
131 FAIR Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. § 121(b).
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year-to-year based on a study of the number of claims received in
past years or from experts' estimations of the number of
remaining claims. Though defendants would likely be against
extending the life of the fund, a mandatory extension would
surely be a better solution than revisiting the resolution of
claims through the tort system that currently exists.
C. In Twenty-Seven Years, Will It Still Work? Giving the
Administrator Greater Power
One of the problems with the FAIR Act is that the
administrative system to manage the funds is insufficient to
handle the enormous load of asbestos claims-especially in the
first few years. In the original version of the bill, a special court
was to be set up, called the Unites States Court of Asbestos
Claims, to administer the fund.132 The special court was
eliminated from the bill during committee hearings in order to
minimize the bureaucracy and cost of administering the fund.
Instead, the second version of the bill proposed administering
the fund through the Court of Federal Claims. 133 Now, the bill
creates the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, a branch of
the Labor Department.134 Considering that there have been at
least three different vehicles for administering the fund, it seems
that Congress is unclear on how it should be administered.
Congress should consider reverting to the original idea of
creating a special court for asbestos claims that would be mostly
independent of the three branches of government, and would not
be politicized. Though creating a special court would raise the
administration cost of the fund, the legislative purpose of the
fund would be better served by its creation. In the first year of
the fund, the nearly 300,000 pending claims will flood the system
and impede its administration. 135 If a special court is created, it
would be better equipped to handle the claims efficiently and
ensure rapid compensation for victims of asbestos-related bodily
injuries. In addition, an independent court will not be influenced
132 Id. § 201.
133 Id. The Court of Federal Claims currently handles monetary claims against
the United States. Even with staff increases, it may be over burdened by the new
responsibilities affecting the performance of the fund.
134 FAIR Act of 2004, S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 101 (2004).




by elections and party politics. Compared to the cost of delay
and inefficiency, the cost of the creation of a special court is not
great.
Another concern for the bill is the long-term solvency and
success of the national fund. The FAIR Act takes little measure
to ensure that, throughout the life of the fund, it is working as
expected and remaining successful. What if, in year 20, the fund
has run out of money and can no longer make payments to
claimants? The administration of the fund should be empowered
to make periodic adjustments to the fund and recommendations
to Congress. With the FAIR Act intended as a long-term
solution to the asbestos problem, Congress cannot expect to
enact the bill and then assume that the problem has been solved.
For example, the fund should require the administrator of the
fund to report to Congress every five years on the functioning of
the bill and forecast the success of the bill for the next five years.
After receiving the report, Congress can make adjustments as
necessary, such as speeding up the contributions, reducing the
contributions, or requiring additional contributions. Insurers
and defendants would be hesitant to accept this proposal.
However, to soften the impact of this provision the bill should
include a clause that would prevent Congress from abandoning
the bill and returning to the tort system.
CONCLUSION
The problems caused by asbestos and the subsequent
litigation are obvious-death, injury, economic downturn,
clogged court dockets, massive transaction costs, long delays in
recovering compensation, and questions about the solvency of
the insurance industry. The court system is ill-suited to solve
these problems; rather, a national legislative act is necessary.
The atmosphere in Congress suggests that most members
support such action, yet everyone agrees that they must proceed
carefully in developing legislation that will be effective.
The FAIR Act, with some adjustments, is the bill that will
ensure a successful solution to the asbestos problem. As the bill
proceeds through the legislative process, Congress must consider
adjusting the amount and timing of the contributions to the fund
to protect initial claimants, and strengthening the back-end of
the fund to protect claimants who have not yet discovered their
injury. Since most Democrats oppose the bill, the prospects of
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this bill being enacted in its current state are slim. However,
making the changes stated in this Note would help to sway the
necessary votes. Both sides are willing to work together and
compromise on this bill, which suggests that the FAIR Act or a
modified form of it will eventually be enacted.
